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Abstract
For the past 15 years, scholars in education have focused on Levinas’s work largely in terms
of his understanding of alterity, of the self-Other relation, of ethics as ‘first philosophy’ and
the significance these concepts have on rethinking educational theory and practice. What I do
in this paper, by way of method, is to start from a slightly different place, from the assertion
that there is indeed something ‘new’ to be explored in Levinas’s philosophy – both in terms of
ideas to be found within his work, and also in terms of the demands educational ideas and
practices place on his work from without. That is, how does the actual, lived specificity of
educational encounters occasion a different set of questions than one would otherwise pose if
thinking only from within the discipline of philosophy, or from a purely theoretical point of
view? In light of this, this paper explores Levinas’s ideas of sensibility, materiality, and
embodiment. I see these not simply as supports for his ethical thought, but as the very core of
incarnation without which his ethics makes no sense. I propose that these ideas are
quintessentially pedagogical aspects of his thought – that is, they are always already rooted in
a relational context of change and alteration of the subject.
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Sensation is the break-up of every system.
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 63
For the past 15 years, scholars in education have focused on Levinas’s work largely in
terms of his understanding of alterity, of the self–Other relation, of ethics as ‘first phi-
losophy’ and the significance these concepts have on rethinking educational theory
and practice (Biesta, 2006; Chinnery, 2003; Ege´a-Kuehne, 2008; Todd, 2003, 2008).
Although some have focused explicitly on teacher–student relations (Joldersma, 2002;
Sa¨fstro¨m, 2003), others put his work into relation with curriculum (Standish, 2008;
Winter, 2014) and counter the educational aim of autonomy with his notion of
heteronomy (Kodelja, 2008; Strhan, 2009). Given the extent to which Levinas’s phi-
losophy is no longer a stranger to educational audiences, it is difficult to see, perhaps,
what more could be said, said differently, or said with different purposes in mind
without rehashing some well-known territory. This is particularly the case if we, as
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both Levinas scholars and educationalists, continue to think of his primary—or sole—
contribution to education as resting in what has in fact already been said. Indeed,
what more is there to say about or do with his work?
In a recent collection, entitled Radicalising Levinas (2010), the editors discuss
precisely this question. They identify Levinasian scholarship in terms of three
waves: the first being commentary and exposition from the 1970s and 1980s; the
second one concerned with contextualising Levinas’s work in poststructuralism and
deconstruction; and the current, third wave can be seen as a revitalisation of his
scholarship in placing his ideas in relation to ‘the most pressing socio-political
issues of our time’ (p. x). Levinas’s work, in this third wave, offers itself to the
forging of new connections with, for example, world hunger (Bernasconi, 2010);
animals (Atterton, 2012; Calarco, 2010; Perpich, 2008); climate change (Edelglass,
2012; Simmons, 2012); and ecology (Llewelyn, 2010). In line with this, the educa-
tional reception of Levinas’s philosophy in the past primarily falls within the first
and second waves. The third wave would now seem to be on the horizon. How-
ever, what all three ‘waves’ assume, I contend, is that ‘Levinas’s philosophy’ itself
is a relatively stable entity and that it is mainly in conversation with contemporary
problems that it can begin to take on new significance. While I think that his work
does indeed speak to contemporary educational concerns, I nonetheless want to
suggest that there are elements of his work that have remained somewhat overshad-
owed by the weightier concepts of the Face and the Other, for which he is best
known.
What I do in this article, by way of method, is to start from a slightly different
place, from the assertion that there is indeed something ‘new’ to be explored in Lev-
inas’s philosophy—both in terms of ideas to be found within his work, and also in
terms of the demands educational ideas and practices place on his work from without.
From the perspective of exploring something new within his philosophy, I do not
mean to suggest that we can ‘find’ or ‘excavate’ a concept that no one has before
seen; as though there were some secret treasure buried in the Levinasian archives just
waiting to be dug out, which, once discovered, will turn our traditional frameworks of
interpretation on their head. Instead, it consists in a far more modest gesture of dis-
placing and repositioning his thought in such a way that new life is breathed into it.
Concepts, such as the Face or the Other, can thereby take on new nuances once they
are untethered from tightly constrained systems of meaning. Thus, newness, as I see
it here, is not about ‘discovering’ or ‘uncovering’ a hidden truth, but about allowing
ideas to circulate in a novel relationship to other ideas that might not have been previ-
ously high up on the Levinasian agenda. This displacement and repositioning shifts
the grounds upon which an idea or concept has come to be comprehended and
thereby shifts our own relationship to it. Although such newness can arise from philo-
sophical reflection on Levinas’s work, it is not through philosophy alone that such
newness comes about. Rather, I suggest that newness arises out of the very demands
that the lived conditions of education place on his ideas and concepts. By this I mean
that rather than see educational contexts as sites of application for Levinas’s philoso-
phy, newness emerges in reading his ideas through the specificity of teaching and
learning encounters. That is, how does the actual, lived specificity of those encounters
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occasion a different set of questions than one would otherwise pose if thinking only
from within the discipline of philosophy, or from a purely theoretical point of view?
For me, such specificity—the design of the classroom, the mode of instruction, the
vulnerability of teachers, the fear of students, the absorption in a topic, the specific
smells and sounds and touches of other bodies—places a certain demand on Levinas’s
ethical philosophy that, I argue, is not entirely out of joint with the very trajectory of
his thought.
In light of this, this article explores that which, in my view, is not focused on
enough in both the philosophical and educational literatures on Levinas—that is, his
ideas of sensibility, materiality and embodiment. I see these not simply as supports
for his ethical thought, but as the very core of incarnation without which his ethics
makes no sense. Tom Sparrow’s (2013) recent examination of the materialist and
metaphysical as well as the phenomenological aspects of Levinas’s ethics will be my
point of departure for displacing and resituating key ideas within the educational
reception of Levinas, namely, the Face and the Other. Through this, I propose that
his views of sensibility and embodiment are quintessentially pedagogical aspects of his
thought—that is, they are always already rooted in a relational context of change and
alteration of the subject—a process through which one becomes someone ‘beyond’
the limits of one’s previous incarnation.1 In conclusion, I turn to a discussion of how
embodiment and sensibility are ethical features of educational life, insofar as educa-
tional settings are indeed concerned with the pedagogical transformation of the self.
However, before doing so, I turn now to situate the question of embodiment within
an educational context.
Situating the Pedagogical Question of Embodiment
Questions of embodiment and materiality have recently been the theme of much
contemporary discussion in educational practice, research methodology and theoris-
ing (e.g. Davies, 2009; Lenz Taguchi, 2011; Special Issue of Gender and Education,
2013). This body of literature has largely, although not exclusively, grown out of a
feminist and Deleuzian orientation to education, seeing the active transformation of
subjectivity in terms that radically admit of the agentic aspects of materiality. Human
bodies are put on par with the objects with which they interact.2 That is, embodi-
ment and materiality are not so much woven together as they are mutually constitu-
tive, each change calling forth new possibilities for subjectivity. There is here an
emphasis on activity and movement, materiality itself being seen not in terms of sub-
stance, but as a constellation of processes. Human bodies are therefore not seen to
be merely the physical counterpart to a self, but part of the very materiality that
comprises any space. This literature opens up important questions for education
regarding its production of spaces of materiality as necessary conditions for teaching,
and indeed, for the kinds of subject transformation that projects such as feminism
are particularly eager to engage. However, what is not so much in focus in this ren-
dering of educational space, are the sensible aspects of human materiality as this
materiality in the form of human bodies is generated through the unpredictable
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contact with the non-human materiality within its environment. That is, in these
moments of contact between things, how do the sensations produced in classrooms
—the touch of the keyboard, the sweatiness of a hand I am holding, the smell of
perfume, the grooves of the desk—matter to the constitution of the body, its surfaces
and borders?
Elspeth Probyn (2004), in an article discussing the place of affect and bodies in
teaching, suggests that the body in particular has been elided (perhaps surprisingly
so) within critical and feminist pedagogies. Her claim is largely based on what she
sees as an abstraction of the ‘live body’ into complex theory.3 That is, while there is a
plethora of theories about how the body is constituted through power dynamics,
normative discourses and systems of discrimination, little attention is paid to the role
played by singular affect. For Probyn, there seems to be a ‘retreat from the experien-
tial body’ (p. 23) in these pedagogies. Instead, drawing in part, although not exclu-
sively, on Deleuze, she notes the significance of affect and sensibility in the concrete
constitution of the form of materiality known as the human body. She sees Deleuze’s
notion of ethology as particularly inviting. He describes it thus: ‘a body affects other
bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being
affected that also defines a body in its individuality’ (Deleuze quoted in Probyn,
2004, p. 37). As such, ‘ethology studies the compositions of relations or capacities
between different things’ (ibid).
As one such relation, a relation that encapsulates the experiential dimensions of
the body, Probyn seeks to bring to the attention of her students what she calls ‘“the
goose bump effect”—that moment when a text sets off a frisson of feelings, remem-
brances, thoughts, and the bodily actions that accompany them’ (p. 29). In fact, by
inviting students to explore an effect of reading that is ‘wild, diffuse and hard to
properly name’ (ibid), Probyn also invites the body into direct contact with what is
going on in classrooms, without, however, suggesting that experiential and sensible
aspects of bodies are unrelated to previous circumstances. ‘What constitutes an affec-
tive response is hugely complex, and is in part the result of an embodied history to
which and with which the body reacts, including how the classroom is conceived
and practiced’ (p. 29). For Probyn, education is about facing the ‘live subject’, com-
plete with discomforts, embarrassments and excitements that close contact with
other bodies, and with texts, generate. Unlike previous ‘transgressive’ theories of the
body that have played a role in feminist discussions of pedagogy, such as that devel-
oped by Jane Gallop (1995, 1997), Probyn seeks to move beyond the body as being
‘engulfed in the sexual’ (p. 34). This strikes me as a highly significant move, not in
order to deny the desirous and sometimes rapturous effects of bodies in classroom
situations, but to open up the terrain for investigating a plethora of sensibilities and
affects that constitute the lived experience of classroom education.
What Probyn’s work brings to the fore is a combination of the new materialism,
which sees bodies as ‘modes not substances’, and a rigorous attention to the unpre-
dictable arrangement of affect and sensibility that is involved in constituting these
modes.
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How better to explain that always quirky, always unknowable combination
that is the classroom? Why is it, we ask either in elation or depression, that
the same material will work so differently in different situations? The magic
or chemistry that seems so elusive to any systemization may well be the
necessary result of the moving arrangement of particles, histories and affects
that are the bodies of teaching and learning. (p. 37)
If changes in bodies are occasioned by these unpredictable and unknowable relations
between things, then the transformative potential of feminist or critical pedagogies is
equally uncertain, and no longer tied to the effects of a particular discourse, theory or
practice. Rather, the pedagogical transformation of the subject is more in line with
what Luce Irigaray would call the ‘alchemy’ of subjectivity and less dependent upon
what critical and feminist pedagogues would call consciousness-raising. Introducing
this unpredictably, however, into our educational discussions should not be seen as
some nihilist defeat of pedagogical purpose, but instead as the generative potential for
moving beyond the systemisation and organisation of teaching and learning into dis-
crete elements. That is, this rather anarchic sensibility challenges the assumption that
the ‘right’ kind of teaching will produce the ‘right’ learning outcomes. As such, it
offers a powerful critique against the types of managerialism and performativity-based
frameworks for systemising teaching and learning we are finding on a global scale. As
Levinas (1969) himself acknowledges in the epigraph to this article, ‘sensibility is the
break-up of every system’; sensibility is precisely that which cannot be contained,
directed or enforced by tightly defined procedures and institutional arrangements.
Probyn’s call for exposing the centrality of the ‘live subject’ for classroom contexts,
thereby opens up a way of thinking pedagogical transformation that necessarily takes
into account the way bodies also transcend (and are not merely products of) structure
and system. Moreover, paying serious attention to the ‘live subject’ means acknowl-
edging the sensible body, without which words such as ‘encounters’, ‘teaching’ and
‘learning’ make little sense. What Probyn in effect exposes (although this is not her
primary purpose) is that you cannot have an educational practice—or any practice for
that matter—without ‘live subjects’ in the first place.
It might seem as though we have come a long way from the Levinasian understand-
ing of self and Other that has heretofore dominated discussions within education.
However, as I explore below, there is a profound attunement to sensibility and the
experiential, embodied subject in Levinas’s thought that complements Probyn’s call
for exposing the corporeal dimensions of the classroom. What Levinas’s work brings
to the table that is not suggested by the new materialism is how bodily sensibility
opens up deeper questions of transcendence and the transformation of bodies that this
entails. My task for the rest of the article is to discuss how such embodied transcen-
dence is central to the pedagogical project of transformation.
Embodiment, Materiality and Transcendence
I often get a sense when reading Levinas’s depiction of subjectivity, especially in
Otherwise than Being, of a subject who is cast into a winter desert, cold and unpro-
tected from the winds, alone with others and burdened with the inevitability of the
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death of oneself and all beings. The subject is at once vulnerable and sacrificial,
wounded and bound, defenceless and subordinate. Out of all this, the subject rises to
respond (responsibly) to the command of the Other, in a relation of physical proxim-
ity, of nearness, of facing. Images of almost unbearable poignancy are brought to
mind: the subject is naked, skinless, helpless and exposed. They are strikingly bleak
images. And while they are no strangers to the landscape of existentialism, haunted as
that landscape is with the approaching horizon of death towards which the subject is
borne without choice or consent, they do seem rather ill-suited to the scene of a
classroom.
However, these images of the subject invoked by Levinas are also striking, I think,
because they call forth a radical sense of embodiment. That is, these images are not
merely metaphors for a subject whose naked skin is vulnerable to the elements and
the passing of human time. Rather, such images of embodiment call forth a ‘reality’
insofar as they seek to approach through language, the pulsing sensibilities that arise
in experiencing the vicissitudes of life. As Bergo (2014) puts it: ‘The central wager of
Otherwise than Being is to express affectivity in its immediacy, with minimal concep-
tualisation’. Yet, these images also call forth a ‘transcendence’ insofar as it is through
an inarticulable embodied relation to the Other that one’s ego surpasses its limita-
tions. On the surface of things, this way of casting embodiment, in terms of both
sensibility and transcendence, would seem to be contradictory, and perhaps somewhat
removed from the notion of the body I discussed above in relation to education.
However, as Sparrow (2013) points out, it is at the intersection of embodiment,
materiality and metaphysics where Levinas’s work gets really interesting. Indeed, here
we find how sensibility and transcendence strangely meet. My intention here is to
explore Levinasian embodiment in order to get a sense of how his work actually helps
to extend and illuminate the question of the sensible body as an eminently
pedagogical one.
Sparrow, with a fresh and irreverent tone, begins his adventure into Levinas’s phi-
losophy by exposing him as ‘someone explicitly engaged in the establishment of a
materialist account of subjectivity’ (p. 3), and one that is committed to ‘thinking the
insubstantiality of the subject’ (p. 55). His oblique way of reading Levinas as a
philosopher of materiality opens up the question as to how, if embodiment is indeed
paramount, we assume the emergence of subjectivity through our contact with others
who are radically different from our selves. To do this, Levinas takes recourse through
sensation. As a philosopher heavily influenced by phenomenology, the experiential
dimensions of subjectivity remain at the heart of the self–Other relation. However,
what Sparrow (2013) notes is that ‘logic of sensation identified by Levinas is not
something disclosed phenomenologically. It is, as Deleuze says, invisible’ (p. 23). As
Levinas (1987) himself explains:
It is a relationship with the In-visible, where invisibility results not from
some incapacity of human knowledge, but from the inaptitude of knowledge
as such—from its in-adequation—to the Infinity of the absolutely other, and
from the absurdity that an event such as coincidence would have here.
(p. 32)
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That is, when Levinas discusses the encounter with the Other, he does not suggest
that the Other ‘appears’ to me, and then can be read and understood through my
sensations and perceptions. Quite the opposite. It is the mystery and unknowability of
the Other that ‘reveal’ themselves. This ‘invisibility’ is precisely what is suggested
when Levinas claims that when we truly face the Other, we do not even notice the
colour of her eyes.4 That is, as a gestalt, the embodied Other remains independent of
the intentionality of the self, or the grasping of the self, as one who seeks to know the
Other through concepts, categories and distinctions. Sparrow (2013) suggests, I think
rightly, that ‘the body lives a time that is out of step with the ego. It signals a reality
that belongs to the sensible dimension of any spectacle, and which Levinas can only
describe as a kind of magical evasion of presence’ (p. 27). What happens through
sensation is that we are ‘directly’ brought into the relation; it occasions ‘a submersion
of oneself’ in the ‘vitality of sensation’ (p. 33). Indeed, Levinas (1998) claims that it
is not our knowledge of sensation, but the act of sensing that matters to his ethics.
The sensible qualities—sounds, colors, hardness, softness—are attributes of
things; but they also seem to be lived in time in the form of psychic life,
stretching out or dividing in the succession of temporal phases, and not only
lasting or being altered in the measurable time of physicists. (p. 31)
What is important to keep in mind here is that such directness lies outside the field of
concepts and categories. Sensation is not a ‘phenomenon’ or an ‘appearance’, but a
rhythm or vibration experienced directly through contact. Sparrow (2013) writes,
‘Sensation does not need to be communicated through a sign, symbol, or concept. It
is the body that comprehends, or rather accommodates, the power of sensation’
(p. 33).
Now, this raises some interesting questions for education, and for understanding
embodied forms of affect more generally. As Ahmed (2004) has written, affect circu-
lates as a form of social currency, and perhaps cannot simply be read so ‘directly’ as
Sparrow is implying. For example, how might cultural practices function to sculpt a
particularly bodily response to a given set of stimuli? How might a Muslim student
experience bodily sensations of fear or pride or resolve in learning that she is not
allowed to wear her hijab in her non-Muslim school? Are such bodily reactions not
always already culturally or socially coded? My response is that following Levinas,
and his move to transcendence, the kind of sensation one experiences may indeed be
read, named and interpreted, but that the experience of sensation itself lies in a state
prior to language. That is, embodied responses, such as Probyn’s ‘goose-bump effect’,
are not first about meaning or content (e.g. goose-bumps can mean many things: fear,
pleasure, eroticism and anxiety), but are first corporeal processes upon which we lay
over our concepts and categories, after the fact as it were. What this suggests is how
to think of the transformative aspects of education as embodying untheorised experi-
ence as opposed to already assuming we know what students ‘feel’ when they ‘sense’
goose-bumps. This is definitely not to suggest that affects cannot or should not be
analysed, but that there also needs to be some room made for untheorised experience
in our classrooms if we are going, paradoxically, to ‘understand’ the specifically
ethical dimensions of teaching and the transformation implied therein. I return to this
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idea more fully in the conclusion. Suffice for now to say that what is at stake in
viewing embodied sensibility as a direct effect of contact with others (human and
non-human alike) is that it opens the subject up to a plurality of possibilities that are
based on not knowing, on something prior to naming experience.
The unknowability of the Other is not merely a trope for suggesting that the other
is an object that appears to me beyond my current frames of cognition, and with
other, better lenses I can come to ‘know’ her better; it is, rather, that the Other is that
which disturbs my sense of knowing, my ego and my identity. And this is where the
phenomenological approach to sensibility hits its limits. That is, Levinas cannot fully
follow through on the idea that the Other, who occasions sensation, is only something
(or someone) who ‘appears’ to me. Instead, there is something of the Other hidden
from view because she ‘is’ more than an appearance. This logic suggests that my
sensations of the Other can never fully capture her limits, since those limits exceed
my very perception. ‘Sensation allows his [Levinas’s] other to “escape closure”, pre-
cisely because sensation is what allows us to make contact with exteriority without
subjecting that exteriority to our representational devices’ (Sparrow, 2013, p. 109).
To embrace phenomenology too closely would mean that the sensations invoked in
relation to the Other remain confined within the ego’s purview and this risks becom-
ing a self-sustaining system, where the other becomes reduced to what I can know
and perceive. But since the Other breaks up the totality of my identity (Levinas,
1969), breaks up systems (Levinas, 1969, p. 63) and breaks up essence (Levinas,
1998, p. 14), it needs to exist as a body in its own right, and not merely present itself
as an object of my perception. As Perpich (2008) writes in countering the
phenomenological critique against Levinas:
the problem of transcendence that is the spur to Levinas’s philosophy is
precisely the problem of whether these [phenomenological] categories and
modes of evaluation exhaust the whole of what is, or whether there is not in
human experience a moment of transcendence when the sway of our rela-
tion to the world is pierced by another order, a sociality in which the other
‘appears’ not only as a thing among things or a force ranged against us but
as a singular being who ‘counts as such’ and whose meaning, therefore, is
not a function of a larger system or whole but signifies outside of every
horizon or context. (pp. 48–49)
However, another problem of transcendence is the kind of generalisation it introduces
into the field of sensibility. That is, if sensation and affect are central to the ethical
relation between I and the Other, which Levinas claims it is, then how can sensation
ever be about the ‘absolute unknowability’ and ‘enigma’ of the Other? Would this not
entail a shift away from the Other’s concrete face, her smell, her voice, her touch?
Sparrow (2013) expresses his worry thus:
But it could be argued that enigmas are practically unsatisfactory and leave
too much to presumption, a loyal ally of discrimination. To allow the Other
to remain enigmatic and absolutely beyond recognition—as Levinas must,
since this is what makes his philosophy innovative—is to claim that the
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imperative the Other commands issues from elsewhere, from some
unmarked locale. That is, some place where my body cannot be and
therefore cannot hear. How do I even begin to respond appropriately to
such a call? When the alterity of the Other is deemed absolute, we overlook
the fact that racism often thrives on such a disregard for the phenomenality
of the face … It seems to me that Levinas ought to have made the color of
the Other’s eyes—along with the rest of his/her phenomenal features—an
essential feature of the Other’s singularity. Even if he doesn’t completely
dismiss such features, Levinas does not attribute enough significance to the
phenomenal in his account of faciality. (p. 93)
While one can wish that Levinas articulated things differently, I do think that his
decision to move beyond the phenomenal positions bodily sensation on a different
register. That is, although sensations occur in the ‘immediacy of the sensible’ (1998,
p. 62), they also are tied to a response to the Other that cannot, for Levinas, be
‘determined’ by thought or categories of the sensible. Instead, it is both affecting and
being affected by that constitute the responsible subject. This means that there is both
vulnerability and suffering on the one hand, and nourishment, enjoyment and giving,
on the other. ‘This immediacy [of the sensible] is first of all the ease of enjoyment,
more immediate than drinking, the sinking into the depths of the element, into its
incomparable freshness, a plenitude and a fulfilment’ (Levinas, 1998, p. 64). As
Sparrow (2013) himself notes:
Although in the final analysis vulnerability is the defining feature of sensibil-
ity for Levinas, it is also a site of what he calls alimentation. Sensations are
not only what threaten to break up identities, they are also what nourish
identities. Our bodies metabolize sensations and thereby incorporate them
into their constitution. Conversely, bodies excrete sensations back into the
environment. (p. 51)
This back-and-forthness of the body is therefore at once both concrete and transcen-
dent. It is concrete at the pure, bodily level of sensation and it is transcendent in two
senses: on the one hand, such sensation lies prior to the naming of experience and
therefore becomes a ‘transcendental condition of practical life’ (Sparrow, 2013,
p. 52), and on the other hand, sensation is precisely that which paradoxically enables
a movement beyond the ego, the self and one’s identity. This reading corresponds, I
think, to the two kinds of transcendence Bergo (2014) has discussed in relation to
Levinas’s early and later work. As to the former, she writes: ‘Levinas’s early project
approached transcendence in light of humans’ irreducible urge to get past the limits
of their physical and social situations. His transcendence is less transcendence-in-the-
world than transcendence through and because of sensibility’. With respect to the
later work, she notes that in Otherwise in Being, ‘transcendence becomes transcen-
dence-in-immanence before it is transcendence toward the other as untotalizable
exteriority’. What I wish to suggest here is that reading Levinas as a philosopher of
materiality allows us to posit the centrality of sensibility both in moving towards the
Other in an act of transformation through which one becomes a responsible subject
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and in giving weight to the importance of unnamed (unnameable) experience as a
condition for that movement to take place. Moreover, what focusing on sensibility
and the body offer to both philosophy and education are a way of conceiving
subjectivity in terms of its pliability and plasticity as it comes into contact with its
environment.
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What I have outlined here briefly in these pages is first that the newness of Levinas’s
philosophy emerges from reading him as a philosopher of materiality, which to my
mind is a response not only to contemporary directions within philosophy, but also
with the pedagogical concerns of transformation that we find within education. To
theorise and practise education as though bodies were either incidental to its purpose
or merely effects of the discourses that inform our teaching, is to dismiss too easily
the ways in which bodies exceed the limits (we think) we are putting upon them. As
Probyn suggests, bodies are not so readily contained, they seem to have their own
‘logic’ in responding to and in being immersed in their environments. Bodies perspire,
blush, sneeze, sigh and breathe, and the skin tingles, twitches, pulses and produces
even goose bumps. The sensational response to the environment is what constitutes
our living flesh; the ‘live subject’ is one who is affecting and affected by its encounters
with other material things. As such, subjects are plastic. ‘The plastic subject is a
dispositional subject, transitory and mutable. Its disposition is informed by its sensory
environments and discernible in the sensations it can endure and produce at any given
moment …’ (Sparrow, 2013, p. 56). And as we have seen it is this malleability occa-
sioned by a vulnerability to the Other that enables the ethical subject to emerge in
Levinas’s work. It is precisely our susceptibility to the Other, and our capacity to
respond to the Other as someone in her own right, outside of my perception of her,
where Levinas locates ethics. The ethical subject is a responsible subject, transcending
the ‘givenness’ of the ego, allowing the immediacy of sensibility to be experienced,
without being named or categorised. Plasticity, it seems to me, is the very nature of
the Levinasian ethical subject.
Plasticity, and the significance of the immediacy of sensibility on Levinas’s terms, is
also what I would call eminently pedagogical. For me, it is the alteration of the self in
an act of ‘sensible transcendence’ that captures what it is we are talking about when
we talk about the transformative possibilities of education. That is, whatever kind of
change we are advocating through our educational projects (better citizens, freer per-
sons, critical thinkers, empathic and caring individuals) is reliant upon the actual
sensations experienced by bodies in encounters with their ever-changing environment.
There is no citizen, person, thinker or individual that is not a living entity made of
flesh and blood. Transformations, whether they occur through an engagement with
ideas or gestures or things, are never purely cognitive events, but always accompanied
by concrete effects which in turn condition the lived environment we then experience
anew.5 Levinas’s bold move was to turn this pedagogical (transformative) moment of
subjectivity, with all its sensations, into the very condition of responsibility.
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But what are we to do with a view of education that is incarnate at the level of the sen-
sate body? It is one thing to theorise sensations and affects, analysing how they come
into being, seeking to understand the place they have in our personal stories or cultural
narratives, but it is wholly other thing to simply ‘let’ them exist and see that existence as
valuable in its own right. That is, while there is a need for analysing the guilt white stu-
dents might feel in confronting their own privilege or the rage that women experience in
the face of continued discrimination, there is also a need for accepting that the bodily
sensations of guilt and rage are nonetheless living experiences that without our intention
circulate in, around and through us. This is not a call for anti-intellectualism—quite the
opposite in fact. Instead, it is a plea for acknowledging the significance of the unname-
able, uncategorisable aspects of sensation that Levinas was at pains to articulate through
his poetic renderings of subjectivity. By making room for the directness of experience
and the immediacy of sensibility as central aspect of classroom life, could we not then
begin to practise a kind of attunement, an orientation to the unpredictable qualities of
bodily responses? After all, if we follow the spirit of Levinas, is it not in and through my
body that my responsibility begins?
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Notes
1. See Todd (2014) for a depiction of pedagogy as that which involves the transformation of
the self—a transformation which involves both the body and spirit.
2. Some authors draw on Karen Barad’s work in physics to speak about intra-action and not
only interaction. For a discussion of the differences, see Hekman (2010), pp. 72–78.
3. One notable exception she makes is O’Farrell et al.’s edited volume entitled, Taught Bodies
(2000).
4. Indeed, Sparrow takes Levinas to task for failing to adequately account for the phenomeno-
logical encounter with the face in all its specificity and links this failure to systems of racial
discrimination. Although I am sympathetic to many of his points, I do think that there is a
broader issue at stake that Sparrow does not fully address. This is the issue of singularity
itself. From the critique raised against Levinas by feminists such as Luce Irigaray and Adri-
ana Caverero, the point is that Levinas’s subject dissolves too easily into a generalisation of
the other, as one who has no (sexual) specificity to contend with. Indeed, these critiques fit
the work of other philosophers of uniqueness, such as Jean-Luc Nancy, who are also
depicted as missing out on the radical singularity of a unique being in making claims about
‘beings’ and ‘others’ in general.
5. For an interesting discussion of this recursion and the emergence of consciousness as an
interactive relation, see Noe¨ (2010) and Thompson (2007). Both authors write at the inter-
section of philosophy, cognitive science and neuroscience and examine the plasticity of
human organisms and their environments.
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